Quick summary
A California internal affairs (IA) investigation is an inquiry by a law enforcement agency into possible misconduct or crimes by one of its own officers. Administrative IA cases can lead to discipline or firing, while criminal IA cases can lead to prosecution.
- Your rights: California’s Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights (POBRA) sets rules for administrative interrogations, including notice of the investigation, a representative of your choice and the right to record.
- Compelled statements: You can be disciplined for refusing to answer, but statements compelled under threat of discipline can’t be used against you in a criminal case.
- Certification: Serious misconduct can also lead California’s POST commission to suspend or revoke your peace officer certification.
- Example: A deputy ordered to answer IA questions about missing evidence can be disciplined for staying silent, but the answers he gives under that order can’t be used to prosecute him.
As a cop, you’re trained to investigate crimes. But what happens when you are the one accused of wrongdoing, and Internal Affairs and prosecutors come calling?
Our California internal affairs defense attorneys can help. Our team includes former police officers and prosecutors, so we know how the system works from the inside. Today we represent people accused of crimes, including police officers accused of criminal or administrative misconduct.
In this article, we explain how IA investigations work in California:
- 1. How do internal affairs investigations work?
- 2. What rights do cops have in IA investigations?
- 3. How can an internal affairs defense attorney help?
You might also be interested in our related articles on Criminal Defense of Police Officers and California State Employees and Criminal Convictions.

1. How do internal affairs investigations work?
In California, internal affairs investigations are law enforcement agency investigations into possible misconduct or criminal activity by their own officers.
Administrative versus criminal investigations
Administrative IA investigations look at whether an officer committed noncriminal, work-related misconduct.
“They are internal matters that can result in termination, suspension or other discipline,” explains former police sergeant and California internal affairs defense lawyer Michael Scafiddi.
Criminal IA units look at whether an officer committed a crime. Those investigations can lead to criminal charges and jail or prison.
Under a 2021 law (SB 2), the stakes of an IA finding have also grown. California’s Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) can suspend or revoke an officer’s certification for serious misconduct, which can end a law enforcement career statewide.1
Example: A Southern California resident files a complaint against Officer Carroll alleging harassment and foul language. This is a disciplinary matter, not a criminal one, so the department’s administrative IA unit investigates whether Officer Carroll broke department rules.
Example: Now suppose Officer Carroll is suspected of stealing and selling narcotics seized on the job. The allegations are criminal, so the department’s criminal IA unit investigates. To avoid tainting a possible prosecution, any administrative investigation of the same conduct is usually handled by a separate unit or put on hold until the criminal investigation is finished.2
Investigations by other agencies
When an officer is accused of misconduct in California, other agencies besides the officer’s own department may get involved. For serious matters, an officer can expect several investigations, sometimes one after another.
Federal officials investigate when there is a possible federal criminal civil rights violation, as happened in the Rodney King beating case.
District attorneys’ offices, such as the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, review officer-involved shootings and in-custody deaths. And when an officer’s shooting kills an unarmed civilian, the California Attorney General’s office investigates.3
Police commissions, inspectors general and other civilian oversight bodies can add another layer of review.

2. What rights do cops have in IA investigations?
Depending on the situation, a California officer facing an IA interrogation can rely on several statutes and constitutional rights. A collective bargaining agreement (union contract) may give additional rights.
POBRA
The Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act, a California statute often called “POBRA,” applies during administrative internal affairs investigations.4
POBRA sets conditions an employing agency must follow when it conducts an interrogation that could lead to “punitive action,” meaning:
- dismissal,
- demotion,
- suspension,
- salary reduction,
- written reprimand, or
- transfer for punishment.5
POBRA’s protections include:
- The interrogation must generally take place at a reasonable hour, preferably while the officer is on duty, and last a reasonable time.
- The officer must be told the rank, name and command of the officer in charge and of everyone else present.
- No more than two interrogators may ask questions at a time, and the officer may not be subjected to offensive language.
- Before the interrogation, the officer must be told the nature of the investigation.
- The officer may bring his or her own recording device.
- When an interrogation focuses on matters likely to lead to punitive action, the officer may have a representative of his or her choice present, such as a union representative or an internal affairs defense lawyer.
- If, before or during the interrogation, it appears the officer may be charged with a crime, the officer must immediately be told of his or her constitutional rights.6
POBRA applies to investigations by an officer’s employing agency that are administrative in nature. It does not apply to an investigation “concerned solely and directly with alleged criminal activities.”7
Here are two examples.
Example: During a Ventura County Sheriff’s Office internal affairs investigation into a deputy’s alleged on-duty misconduct, an investigator learns the deputy might be involved in embezzlement of firearms. Because embezzlement is a crime, the investigator turns the matter over to the department’s Major Crimes Bureau. Bureau detectives arrest the deputy, read him his Miranda rights and tell him the interview is part of a criminal investigation. He waives his rights and makes incriminating statements. POBRA does not apply to this separate criminal investigation, even though the sheriff’s office is the deputy’s employer.8
Example: After an inmate at Corcoran State Prison is allegedly assaulted in a set-up by correctional officers, the California Department of Justice investigates. The warden tells the officers they must cooperate or face discipline for insubordination. They are told they can’t leave, are interviewed by DOJ on prison grounds, aren’t allowed to consult a lawyer and aren’t told whether they are witnesses or targets. A California appeals court held POBRA did apply in this “hybrid” case, because the prison and DOJ acted together and the warden used his power as the officers’ employer.9 Later appeals court decisions have criticized that case’s narrow reading of POBRA’s criminal-investigation exception, so whether POBRA applies to a joint or outside criminal investigation can depend on the facts and the court.
The Lybarger admonishment
Like any employee, a cop has to follow orders from the boss, even during a California internal affairs investigation. If a commanding officer orders an officer to answer a question and the officer stays silent, the officer can be disciplined for insubordination.
But the officer still has the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.
The U.S. Supreme Court resolved this conflict by giving the officer protection for “compelled” statements. Under the Garrity/Lefkowitz rule, an officer can be disciplined for refusing an order to answer, but a statement given under that threat (and evidence derived from it) can’t be used against the officer in a criminal prosecution.10
The California Supreme Court, interpreting POBRA, went a step further in Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles. If it appears during an IA investigation that an officer might face criminal charges, the officer must be advised of his or her rights. If the officer is ordered to answer, he or she must be told that:
- refusing to answer can be treated as insubordination, leading to administrative discipline, and
- any statement made under the threat of that discipline can’t be used against him or her in a later criminal case.11
Prosecutors may still get access to compelled internal affairs statements. In California, officer personnel records are generally confidential, but that confidentiality doesn’t apply to investigations by a grand jury, a district attorney’s office or the Attorney General’s office.12 Even if prosecutors see the statements, they may not “use” them. They must show that their evidence came from an independent source rather than the immunized IA statement.13
Some IA records are also no longer confidential. Since 2019, California law has made records of certain incidents public, such as police shootings, serious uses of force, and sustained findings of sexual assault or dishonesty, and later laws have added more categories.14
For how a defendant can get access to an officer’s discipline file, see our related article on Pitchess motions. In a Pitchess motion, the defendant in a criminal case asks the court for access to an officer’s personnel file, usually to find people who filed earlier complaints against the officer and can be used to challenge the officer’s testimony at trial.
Constitutional protections
Peace officers are not “relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights.”15 Besides the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, officers have:
- a Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
- a Sixth Amendment right to a lawyer once criminal charges are filed (and, under Miranda, the right to a lawyer during custodial police questioning).
This means officers can’t be:
- arrested without probable cause,
- subjected to unreasonable detention, or
- questioned in custody without being told of their rights.
After the LAPD Rampart scandal, for example, three officers brought a Section 1983 lawsuit claiming their constitutional rights were violated during the investigation. A jury found they had been arrested without probable cause and awarded each officer about $5 million in damages, and the federal appeals court upheld the verdict.16
Things get trickier when it comes to questioning of officers by their own employers. It may not be clear whether the agency is acting as an employer or as a law enforcer, which can leave an officer in a gray area between an internal affairs investigation and an arrest.
Consider a 2007 Ninth Circuit case:
Example: A man claims Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputies assaulted him. The deputies are told to return to the station for questioning, but they are never arrested or searched, are allowed to talk to each other, and later get overtime pay. Still, they are told they are the focus of a criminal investigation, and the captain harshly tells them the only way to avoid charges is to come forward. Each deputy declines to give a statement. They are moved from patrol to station duty, and a year later they are ordered to give compelled statements. They comply and are cleared. When they sue for constitutional violations, the court rules against them: being ordered by their employer to stay and be questioned wasn’t an unlawful “seizure,” and there was no Fifth Amendment violation because no compelled statement was used against them. A dissenting judge wrote that an employer “must clarify whether it is questioning the employee in its capacity as an employer or as a law enforcer.”17
3. How can an internal affairs defense attorney help?
Chances are, you’ve seen a good criminal defense lawyer help a suspect avoid trouble. Why deny yourself the same help when the tables are turned?
At Shouse Law Group, we keep cop hours. Whether you’ve been involved in a critical incident or face an internal affairs interrogation or criminal charge, we’re a phone call away.
As former law enforcement ourselves, we’re not intimidated by IA, the media or anyone else. We fight hard but fair, and we can help you understand what is happening and how to protect your rights.
Call us for a free consultation, or reach us through our contact page.
Helpful resources:
- Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC)
- California Correctional Peace Officers Association
- Los Angeles Police Protective League
Legal references:
- California Penal Code 13510.8(a)(2) PC: “The commission may suspend or revoke the certification of a peace officer if the person has been terminated for cause from employment as a peace officer for, or has, while employed as a peace officer, otherwise engaged in, any serious misconduct as described in subdivision (b).”
- This point is emphasized in the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Standards and Guidelines for Internal Affairs (undated), p. 24. (“Great caution must be exercised to avoid a compelled statement or the fruits of a compelled statement from leaking into the criminal investigation. To do otherwise risks losing the potential criminal prosecution because of constitutional violations of the privilege against self-incrimination.”) The Standards and Guidelines include flowcharts of the IA frameworks of the Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department.
- California Government Code 12525.3(b)(1): “A state prosecutor shall investigate incidents of an officer-involved shooting resulting in the death of an unarmed civilian. The Attorney General is the state prosecutor unless otherwise specified or named.”
- California Government Code 3300 and following sections (the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act); Government Code 3301 (officers covered).
- California Government Code 3303: “For the purpose of this chapter, punitive action means any action that may lead to dismissal, demotion, suspension, reduction in salary, written reprimand, or transfer for purposes of punishment.”
- California Government Code 3303 (as of November 2026; see note 5 above): “When any public safety officer is under investigation and subjected to interrogation by his or her commanding officer, or any other member of the employing public safety department, that could lead to punitive action, the interrogation shall be conducted under the following conditions. For the purpose of this chapter, punitive action means any action that may lead to dismissal, demotion, suspension, reduction in salary, written reprimand, or transfer for purposes of punishment. (a) The interrogation shall be conducted at a reasonable hour, preferably at a time when the public safety officer is on duty, or during the normal waking hours for the public safety officer, unless the seriousness of the investigation requires otherwise. If the interrogation does occur during off-duty time of the public safety officer being interrogated, the public safety officer shall be compensated for any off-duty time in accordance with regular department procedures, and the public safety officer shall not be released from employment for any work missed. (b) The public safety officer under investigation shall be informed prior to the interrogation of the rank, name, and command of the officer in charge of the interrogation, the interrogating officers, and all other persons to be present during the interrogation. All questions directed to the public safety officer under interrogation shall be asked by and through no more than two interrogators at one time. (c) The public safety officer under investigation shall be informed of the nature of the investigation prior to any interrogation. (d) The interrogating session shall be for a reasonable period taking into consideration gravity and complexity of the issue being investigated. The person under interrogation shall be allowed to attend to his or her own personal physical necessities. (e) The public safety officer under interrogation shall not be subjected to offensive language or threatened with punitive action, except that an officer refusing to respond to questions or submit to interrogations shall be informed that failure to answer questions directly related to the investigation or interrogation may result in punitive action. No promise of reward shall be made as an inducement to answering any question. The employer shall not cause the public safety officer under interrogation to be subjected to visits by the press or news media without his or her express consent nor shall his or her home address or photograph be given to the press or news media without his or her express consent. (f) No statement made during interrogation by a public safety officer under duress, coercion, or threat of punitive action shall be admissible in any subsequent civil proceeding. This subdivision is subject to the following qualifications: (1) This subdivision shall not limit the use of statements made by a public safety officer when the employing public safety department is seeking civil sanctions against any public safety officer, including disciplinary action brought under Section 19572. (2) This subdivision shall not prevent the admissibility of statements made by the public safety officer under interrogation in any civil action, including administrative actions, brought by that public safety officer, or that officer’s exclusive representative, arising out of a disciplinary action. (3) This subdivision shall not prevent statements made by a public safety officer under interrogation from being used to impeach the testimony of that officer after an in camera review to determine whether the statements serve to impeach the testimony of the officer. (4) This subdivision shall not otherwise prevent the admissibility of statements made by a public safety officer under interrogation if that officer subsequently is deceased. (g) The complete interrogation of a public safety officer may be recorded. If a tape recording is made of the interrogation, the public safety officer shall have access to the tape if any further proceedings are contemplated or prior to any further interrogation at a subsequent time. The public safety officer shall be entitled to a transcribed copy of any notes made by a stenographer or to any reports or complaints made by investigators or other persons, except those which are deemed by the investigating agency to be confidential. No notes or reports that are deemed to be confidential may be entered in the officer’s personnel file. The public safety officer being interrogated shall have the right to bring his or her own recording device and record any and all aspects of the interrogation. (h) If prior to or during the interrogation of a public safety officer it is deemed that he or she may be charged with a criminal offense, he or she shall be immediately informed of his or her constitutional rights. (i) Upon the filing of a formal written statement of charges, or whenever an interrogation focuses on matters that are likely to result in punitive action against any public safety officer, that officer, at his or her request, shall have the right to be represented by a representative of his or her choice who may be present at all times during the interrogation. The representative shall not be a person subject to the same investigation. The representative shall not be required to disclose, nor be subject to any punitive action for refusing to disclose, any information received from the officer under investigation for noncriminal matters. This section shall not apply to any interrogation of a public safety officer in the normal course of duty, counseling, instruction, or informal verbal admonishment by, or other routine or unplanned contact with, a supervisor or any other public safety officer, nor shall this section apply to an investigation concerned solely and directly with alleged criminal activities. (j) No public safety officer shall be loaned or temporarily reassigned to a location or duty assignment if a sworn member of his or her department would not normally be sent to that location or would not normally be given that duty assignment under similar circumstances.”
- California Government Code 3303(i) (see note 6 above): “nor shall this section apply to an investigation concerned solely and directly with alleged criminal activities.”
- Van Winkle v. County of Ventura (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 492, 501 (“When Van Winkle was interrogated by the MCB detective, he was advised it was a criminal investigation, not an administrative one. Van Winkle knew this because he had been arrested and was in custody. He made statements voluntarily after he waived his Miranda rights. He was advised that because it was not an administrative investigation the detective could not order him to speak. There is no evidence in this record to show that he was confused about the nature of this investigation or his rights.”)
- California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State of California (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 294, 307 (“The CDC and DOJ must be considered to have been acting together in this investigation. The CDC did not merely order the correctional officers to cooperate with the DOJ investigation, but delivered interviewees to DOJ investigators, and threatened them with arrest and/or discipline if they asserted their rights during interrogation by DOJ agent. Until they had given statements, correctional officers were prevented from leaving prison grounds by their employer. Hallway exits and interrogation rooms were guarded by the CDC. The interviews took place during work hours or immediately thereafter, on work premises. Upon being told by DOJ interrogators that an officer was not providing satisfactory responses during the interrogation, CDC employees threatened the officers with criminal and disciplinary sanctions. Under these circumstances, the CDC and the DOJ must be considered to have been acting in concert.” Criticized on this point in Van Winkle v. County of Ventura (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 492, 499 (see note 8 above).
- Garrity v. New Jersey (1967) 385 U.S. 493, 500 [officer could not be forced to waive privilege or lose job] (“The choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs or to incriminate themselves. The option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent. That practice, like interrogation practices we reviewed in Miranda v. Arizona…is ‘likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and rational choice.’ We think the statements were infected by the coercion inherent in this scheme of questioning, and cannot be sustained as voluntary under our prior decisions.”); Lefkowitz v. Turley (1973) 414 U.S. 70, 82 [architects could not be compelled to testify in grand jury proceeding under threat of loss of contracts] (“The State sought to interrogate appellees about their transactions with the State, and to require them to furnish possibly incriminating testimony by demanding that they waive their immunity and by disqualifying them as public contractors when they refused. It seems to us that the State intended to accomplish what Garrity specifically prohibited — to compel testimony that had not been immunized. The waiver sought by the State, under threat of loss of contracts, would have been no less compelled than a direct request for the testimony without resort to the waiver device. A waiver secured under threat of substantial economic sanction cannot be termed voluntary.”)
- Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 40 Cal.3d 822, 829 (“What were appellant’s ‘constitutional rights’? Given the context of an administrative inquiry into possible criminal misconduct, we think it likely the Legislature intended that interrogated officers be advised of their so-called ‘Miranda rights,’ as modified by the Lefkowitz/Garrity rule previously discussed. In other words, appellant should have been told, among other things, that although he had the right to remain silent and not incriminate himself, (1) his silence could be deemed insubordination, leading to administrative discipline, and (2) any statement made under the compulsion of the threat of such discipline could not be used against him in any subsequent criminal proceeding. Although appellant was properly advised of the adverse effect of his silence, he was never told of the extent of the protection afforded to any statements he might make. That omission was critically important here. It is argued that, because appellant refused to answer any questions, he was not harmed by the failure to advise him of his rights. Yet had appellant understood that his statements during the administrative interview could not be used against him in a criminal proceeding, he might well have elected to cooperate rather than remain silent.”); Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 444 (“Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”)
- California Penal Code 832.7(a) PC (as amended effective January 1, 2026): “Except as provided in subdivision (b), the personnel records of peace officers and custodial officers … are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code. This section does not apply to investigations or proceedings concerning the conduct of peace officers or custodial officers, or an agency or department that employs those officers, conducted by a grand jury, a district attorney’s office, the Attorney General’s office, or the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, or a civilian oversight board or commission ….”
- In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Huntington Beach Police Officers Assn. v. United States) (9th Cir. 1996) 75 F.3d 446, 448 [police department must comply with grand jury subpoena of personnel files relevant to federal civil rights investigation] (“We hold that the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege, when applied to statements by police officers in internal affairs files, must focus on the use of those statements against the officers who gave them. The statements are not privileged from production to a subpoenaing authority. But the Fifth Amendment guards against any improper use of them. That protection is provided by the screening and redaction proposed here by the Department of Justice and by a later Kastigar hearing.”) See also Gwillim v. City of San Jose (9th Cir. 1991) 929 F.2d 465, 468 [no constitutional violation where administrator turned over immunized statement to prosecutor] (“We, however, need not and do not decide whether in fact Gwillim’s immunity was violated by what Sanderson did. The question before this court is whether transmission of the information was in itself a violation of the constitutional privilege. The law of this circuit is clear that a prosecutor’s access to immunized testimony is not a violation of the privilege. A wall between the immunized testimony and the prosecution would be the equivalent of granting transactional immunity, thus negating the plain import of Kastigar. The defendants in this case could, therefore, have transmitted the information in accordance with the California statute without violating the Constitution. Gwillim made no showing that the defendants knew that the prosecutor would use the information to motivate the complainant or that the defendants could reasonably have anticipated such use. Under these circumstances it was not their responsibility to assure that Sanderson’s use of the information complied with the Constitution.” Internal quotations omitted.); Kastigar v. United States (1972) 406 U.S. 441, 461 [use and derivative use immunity is coextensive with scope of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination] (“Both the statute and the Fifth Amendment allow the government to prosecute using evidence from legitimate independent sources. … We conclude that the immunity provided by 18 U.S.C. 6002 leaves the witness and the prosecutorial authorities in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege. The immunity therefore is coextensive with the privilege and suffices to supplant it.”)
- California Penal Code 832.7(b)(1) PC (see note 12 above) (records of officer shootings, uses of force causing death or great bodily injury, and sustained findings of unreasonable or excessive force, failure to intervene, sexual assault, dishonesty and prejudice or discrimination, among others, “shall not be confidential and shall be made available for public inspection pursuant to the California Public Records Act”).
- Garrity v. New Jersey (1967) 385 U.S. 493, 500 (see note 10 above).
- Harper v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3d 1010 (“After an eleven-day trial, the jury returned a special verdict in favor of the Officers, finding that the Officers’ constitutional rights were violated by the City and by Chief Parks in his official capacity. The jury awarded each officer compensatory damages in the amount of $5,000,001. … Both the jury’s verdict and the jury’s damages award are supported by substantial evidence.”)
- Aguilera v. Baca (9th Cir. 2007) 510 F.3d 1161, 1175 (Kozinski, in dissent: “When a law enforcement agency suspects one of its employees of criminal wrongdoing, their relationship becomes a strained and complex one. The employer, of course, retains all powers over the employee qua employer-it may ask him to work overtime, complete reports, answer the questions of supervisors and generally comply with the terms of the employment relationship. In addition, however, the employer is also in the business of detecting and prosecuting criminal activity, so the employer can-and generally has the duty to gather evidence that may be used to prosecute the employee and others. Whether the employer is wearing one hat or the other (or both) is often unclear, which can put the employee in a precarious situation by forcing him to choose between disobeying an order from his employer and giving up the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. In such situations, the employer must not play on this ambiguity to the disadvantage of the employee; rather, it must clarify whether it is questioning the employee in its capacity as an employer or as a law enforcer. Where the employer fails to do this, the employee is entitled to act on the assumption that he is dealing with a law enforcement agency, if a reasonable person in his position would have so believed. Plaintiffs here easily meet this standard, and so they are entitled to bring their case before a jury; this is precisely the kind of conflict that a group of citizens drawn from the community is in the best position to resolve.”)