"Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude"
in California Criminal Law

You might have heard the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude." It's a common term in law. It derives from the Latin word turpis – which means foul, disgraceful or ugly.

It's also an important legal concept. A conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) can cause a witness to be impeached, a lawyer to lose his or her bar license, and a lawful permanent resident to be deported from the United States.

Yet despite the term's widespread use, the concept of CIMT can leave us scratching our heads. What exactly does it mean? Are some crimes more morally "ugly" than others?

In this article, our California Criminal Defense Lawyers discuss the meaning of moral turpitude and how it may impact you.¹ We address the following:

1. What is the significance of CIMT in
    California law?

1.1. CIMT and impeachment of witnesses

1.2. Crimes of Moral Turpitude & immigration cases

1.3. CIMT and attorney and state employee discipline
       cases

2. Is there a legal definition of "crime involving
    moral turpitude"?

2.1. General idea of CIMT

2.2. Intent crimes

2.3. Crimes involving dishonesty or fraud

2.4. Crimes involving other reprehensible behavior

3. Which offenses are CIMT?

If you have questions after reading this article, we invite you to contact us at Shouse Law Group for a consultation.

1. What is the significance of CIMT in
    California law?

Being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude can pull a hefty punch:

• in criminal cases, it can be used to impeach the credibility of a witness



• in federal immigration cases, one or more convictions can be used as a basis for removal from the country



• in certain licensing and employee discipline cases, it can be the basis for license/job discipline



• a judge convicted of CIMT will be removed from the bench²



• in cases where a former juvenile offender tries to make a fresh start, a CIMT as an adult can prevent sealing of the juvenile record



• if you have an alcoholic beverage license, it can cause you to lose it³

1.1. CIMT and impeachment of witnesses

One important area where crimes involving moral turpitude comes up is impeachment of witnesses. In California criminal trials, witnesses can be impeached with past felony convictions involving moral turpitude.⁴

If a witness takes the stand to testify about something, jurors may not be as apt to believe that testimony if the witness has a past conviction for an offense involving dishonesty or other reprehensible behavior.

Let's look at an example:

Example: A California man gets into a physical fight with another man over $20. He is charged with assault with a deadly weapon and goes to trial. He testifies in his own defense but his past comes back to haunt him: he has a past felony conviction for willfully failing to appear in court after being granted bail. The prosecutor uses the past conviction to impeach his credibility – prompting the jury to question whether his testimony is believable.

The past conviction is properly admitted for impeachment. The court explains that: 'The elements of this felony manifest a crime that is at heart a crime of deceit: the defendant has been granted liberty from custody on the promise he will be present in the future…Because deceit is inherently dishonest conduct, failure to appear is a crime of moral turpitude.'⁵

Limitations and exceptions

To ensure a fair trial, the trial court retains discretion to exclude a felony crime of turpitude conviction if its probative value is outweighed by undue consumption of time, risk of undue prejudice or confusion of the issues.⁶

Additionally, a past felony conviction is not admissibly for impeachment purposes if:

• a California governor's pardon was granted based on innocence,



• the witness was granted a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon, OR



• for a non-defendant witnesses, the criminal record was expunged⁷

"Least adjudicative elements"

To determine whether a conviction for a past conviction is admissible for impeachment purposes, the court looks at the "least adjudicative elements" of the offense.

"The judge evaluates whether a given kind of crime in the abstract constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude," explains Newport Beach Criminal Defense Lawyer Zachary McCready, a former cop who is bilingual in Spanish and has a proven track record of successful representations in all kinds of felony and misdemeanor cases.

The court doesn't look behind the conviction to see if moral turpitude existed in the circumstances of a particular conviction.⁸

1.2. Crimes of Moral Turpitude & immigration cases

The issue also comes up in the context of the criminal defense of California immigrants.

For immigrants and non-citizens, crimes involving moral turpitude are among the California criminal convictions that can trigger deportation from the United States...even for those with a green card, visa or lawful permanent resident status.

Legal aliens

If you are a legal alien who's been convicted of one crime of moral turpitude, you may suffer deportation if

• the crime allegedly occurred within five years after you've been admitted to the U.S., and



• the crime may carry a sentence of a year or more

This means that even if you served less than a year for a crime of moral turpitude conviction, you may still face deportation if the maximum possible sentence was a year or more.

Furthermore, if you've been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (that arose out of separate events), you may be deported regardless of when the crimes allegedly occurred and their sentences.⁹

Undocumented aliens

With respect to undocumented aliens, if you've committed a crime involving moral turpitude or merely admitted to committing one, then you're ineligible for admission into the United States.

However, under the "petty offense exception," you may still be admissible if you committed only one such crime AND:

• the maximum possible sentence is one year of jail,



• you were sentenced to no more than six months jail time

In addition, aliens who committed a crime of moral turpitude while still a juvenile may be admissible as long as the jail sentence was completed more than five years prior to applying to the U.S for admission.¹⁰

If you haven't been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude but you've admitted to having committed one, additional facts must be proven before the U.S. can deem you inadmissible.

*Note: Even if your criminal record is adversely affecting your immigration status, it may be possible to vacate and remove a California criminal conviction so as to alleviate these consequences.

1.3. CIMT and attorney and state employee discipline cases

Criminal convictions of moral turpitude are also relevant when it comes to California State Bar attorney discipline cases and California state civil service employee discipline cases.¹¹

"Look past the elements"

In these cases, where someone's fitness for the job is at issue, the State Personnel Board and State Bar Court can look past the elements of the crime to the circumstances at issue in a given conviction to see if moral turpitude was involved. (If the crime on its face is so awful as to constitute moral turpitude per se, there is no need to make further inquiry.)

The outcome is often the same under the "look past the elements" test and the "least adjudicative elements" test. But sometimes the results can be surprising.

Here is an example:

Example: A California lawyer is convicted of assault with a deadly weapon (ADW). He is punished by the criminal justice system for the crime but is not disbarred. Although lawyers can lose their licenses for convictions involving moral turpitude, the court decides no CIMT exists in this particular case¹².

Change the facts: In a trial for possession of phencyclidine (PCP), defendant's cousin takes the stand and testifies that he never saw his cousin with PCP. The prosecutor responds by impeaching the cousin's credibility with the cousin's former conviction for ADW.

Impeachment is proper in this case because the least adjudicative elements of the crime of ADW involve moral turpitude. CIMT analysis in an impeachment case is not the same as in a state bar discipline case, where 'simple fairness' requires the court to look behind the conviction.¹³

2. Is there a legal definition of "crime involving
    moral turpitude"?

You'd think with so much riding on CIMT we'd have a crystal-clear idea of what it means. But even the state's highest court, the California Supreme Court, recognized that moral turpitude "is an elusive concept incapable of precise general definition."¹⁴

And in a recent immigration case involving indecent exposure, the Ninth Circuit began its opinion with this sentence:

Once again we face the question of what is moral turpitude: a nebulous question that we are required to answer on the basis of judicially established categories of criminal conduct.

(Over a dissent, the court decided that indecent exposure does not categorically constitute a crime of moral turpitude).¹⁵

2.1. General idea of CIMT

Elusive, nebulous or not…CIMT is a concept to be reckoned with. To flesh out what it means, we can look at principles and court precedents.

As far as principles go, we can see that CIMT are generally intent crimes involving dishonesty or fraud, or other reprehensible, antisocial behavior that harms and/or corrupts others.

Here is an often-quoted definition from a 1938 case in which a lawyer was disbarred for a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (conspiring to obstruct justice):

Moral turpitude has been defined by many authorities as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man."¹⁶

2.2. Intent crimes

Crimes involving moral turpitude are almost always intent crimes. This means that the crime must require deliberate intent or at least recklessness with an actual awareness of the risk. It also means that crimes involving moral turpitude generally don't include strict liability crimes (such as traffic tickets) or negligence crimes.

This makes sense when you think about it. When we are dealing with a CIMT we are not dealing with a mere mistake, accident or bad judgment call.

Let's look at an example:

Example: Defendant White is on trial for conspiracy to sell narcotics. When he takes the stand to testify, the prosecutor impeaches his credibility with an earlier conviction for Penal Code Section 246 pc, shooting at an inhabited dwelling.

Impeachment is proper because PC § 246 involves moral turpitude. Even if White did not actually intend to harm anyone when he shot at the inhabited dwelling, his action shows a wanton disregard for the life of another (the person who might be in the dwelling).¹⁷ This is antisocial behavior and constitutes moral turpitude.

2.3. Crimes involving dishonesty or fraud

One category of crimes traditionally thought to constitute moral turpitude are those involving dishonesty or fraud.

We've seen the rationale for this in relation to witness credibility issues. We can also understand how a person's honesty and capacity for deceit can impact that person's fitness to practice law or to hold a position with the state civil service.

On a more fundamental level, we can appreciate how such offenses cut to the core of the "private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general."

How can we function in our relationships and as a society if we don't have a foundation of trust?

2.4. Crimes involving other reprehensible behavior

"Crimes of moral turpitude" analysis does not begin and end with dishonesty and fraud. Other behavior also is considered so depraved and antisocial that it involves the ugliness of moral turpitude. These are crimes like murder and rape and child molestation and drug dealing – crimes that involve an intent to harm or corrupt others.

When it comes to impeachment cases, the concept is expressed as a "readiness to do evil."¹⁸

The Ninth Circuit put it this way:

A review of [Board of Immigration Appeals] and Ninth Circuit precedent reveals that nonfraudulent crimes of moral turpitude almost always involve an intent to harm someone, the actual infliction of harm upon someone, or an action that affects a protected class of victim.¹⁹

3. Which offenses are CIMT?

It is not possible to list every possible crime involving moral turpitude in every possible circumstance. As we've discussed, the outcome of the analysis can depend of context.

Further, courts continue to disagree on the matter.²⁰

That said, precedents are as helpful as principles in CIMT analysis. What follows is a list of crimes that have been held to constitute CIMT:

• assault with intent to commit murder²¹



• attempted lewd act on a minor²²



• arson²³



• auto theft²⁴



• battery on a peace officer²⁵



• burglary²⁶



• child abuse²⁷



• contributing to the delinquency of a minor (PC § 272)²⁸



• criminal threats²⁹



• domestic violence³⁰



• DUI (felony in California)³¹



• embezzlement³²



• extortion³³



• false personation to obtain a benefit (PC § 529(3))³⁴



• forgery³⁵



• fraud³⁶



• fraudulent vehicle registration³⁷



• fraudulently collecting unemployment benefits³⁸



• grand theft³⁹



• kidnapping⁴⁰



• possession for sale of controlled substance⁴¹



• rape⁴²



• robbery⁴³



• mail fraud⁴⁴



• murder⁴⁵



• perjury⁴⁶



• petty theft⁴⁷



• pimping and pandering (PC § 266(h) and (i))⁴⁸



• reckless evading⁴⁹



• securities violations⁵⁰



• solicitation to commit assault (PC § 653(f))⁵¹



• receiving stolen property⁵²



• vandalism⁵³



• vehicular manslaughter with extensive priors⁵⁴



• voluntary manslaughter⁵⁵

Our California Criminal Defense Lawyers Can Help…

If you have a question concerning moral turpitude, we invite you to call our California Criminal Defense Lawyers at Shouse Law Group to discuss your case.

We also have a wide array of articles on criminal law topics including: Legal Defenses, Appeals, Criminal Defense of Immigrants, Pretrial Process, Professional Discipline and Tasers and Excessive Force.

References:

¹Our California Criminal Defense Lawyers have local Los Angeles law offices in Beverly Hills, Burbank, Glendale, Lancaster, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Pasadena, Pomona, Torrance, Van Nuys, West Covina and Whittier. We have additional law offices conveniently located throughout the state in Orange County, San Diego, Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura, San Jose, Oakland, the San Francisco Bay area, and several nearby cities.

²California Constitution, Article VI, Section 18(c) provides: "(c) The Commission on Judicial Performance shall suspend a judge from office without salary when in the United States the judge pleads guilty or no contest or is found guilty of a crime punishable as a felony under California or federal law or of any other crime that involves moral turpitude under that law. If the conviction is reversed, suspension terminates, and the judge shall be paid the salary for the judicial office held by the judge for the period of suspension. If the judge is suspended and the conviction becomes final, the Commission on Judicial Performance shall remove the judge from office."

³California Business and Professions Code Section 24200(d) provides: "The following are the grounds that constitute a basis for the suspension or revocation of licenses…(d) The plea, verdict, or judgment of guilty, or the plea of nolo contendere to any public offense involving moral turpitude or under any federal law prohibiting or regulating the sale, exposing for sale, use, possession, or giving away of alcoholic beverages or intoxicating liquors or prohibiting the refilling or reuse of distilled spirits containers charged against the licensee."

⁴With respect to misdemeanor convictions, see People v. Cadogan 173 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1514 (2009) ("To analyze this issue, it is necessary to revisit why the fact of a misdemeanor conviction is inadmissible while the actual conduct which led to the misdemeanor conviction is (in the court's discretion) admissible. In Wheeler, a case in which a key defense witness was impeached by asking her about a prior misdemeanor conviction, our Supreme Court reaffirmed the long-established understanding that a misdemeanor conviction comes within the statutory rule of inadmissible hearsay. The Wheeler court therefore found error in the admission of testimony confirming the existence of a prior misdemeanor conviction, but affirmed because the Wheeler defendant failed to object on hearsay grounds at trial." Internal citations and quotations omitted)

⁵People v. Maestas 132 Cal.App.4th 1552, 1556 (2005)

⁶California Evidence Code Section 352 provides: "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury."

⁷California Evidence Code Section 788 provides: "For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be shown by the examination of the witness or by the record of the judgment that he has been convicted of a felony unless: (a) A pardon based on his innocence has been granted to the witness by the jurisdiction in which he was convicted. (b) A certificate of rehabilitation and pardon has been granted to the witness under the provisions of Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 4852.01) of Title 6 of Part 3 of the Penal Code. (c) The accusatory pleading against the witness has been dismissed under the provisions of Penal Code Section 1203.4, but this exception does not apply to any criminal trial where the witness is being prosecuted for a subsequent offense. (d) The conviction was under the laws of another jurisdiction and the witness has been relieved of the penalties and disabilities arising from the conviction pursuant to a procedure substantially equivalent to that referred to in subdivision (b) or (c)." SEE ALSO California Constitution Article I, Section 28(f)(2) and (4), which provides: "(f) In addition to the enumerated rights provided in subdivision (b) that are personally enforceable by victims as provided in subdivision (c), victims of crime have additional rights that are shared with all of the People of the State of California. These collectively held rights include, but are not limited to, the following….(2) Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and postconviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code Sections 352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press….(4) Use of Prior Convictions. Any prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding, whether adult or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal proceeding. When a prior felony conviction is an element of any felony offense, it shall be proven to the trier of fact in open court."

⁸People v. Castro 38 Cal.3d 301, 316 (1985) [impeachment] ("Wigmore points out that the reasons of auxiliary policy - avoidance of unfair surprise and confusion of issues - which generally prohibit impeachment of a witness with extrinsic proof of particular acts of misconduct, do not apply where the misconduct has ripened into a conviction. A witness ought to know what convictions he has suffered and their proof should not entail complicated factual questions. Obviously, however, if the conviction is only admissible if it evinces moral turpitude and such turpitude can only be established through extrinsic evidence, confusion of issues becomes inevitable and unfair surprise more than probable. Therefore, as in the Finley-Crowson line of cases, a witness' prior conviction should only be admissible for impeachment if the least adjudicated elements of the conviction necessarily involve moral turpitude. We reemphasize that even such admissibility is subject to trial court discretion under section 352." Internal citation omitted)

⁹8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A) ("(a)…Any alien (including an alien crewman) in and admitted to the United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is within one or more of the following classes of deportable aliens: (A)… (i) …Any alien who--(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or 10 years in the case of an alien provided lawful permanent resident status under section 1255(j) of this title) after the date of admission, and (II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed, is deportable. (ii)… Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial, is deportable.")

¹⁰8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A) and (B) ("(a)… Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States… (2)…(A)…(i)…Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of--(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime… (ii)…Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if--(I) the crime was committed when the alien was under 18 years of age, and the crime was committed (and the alien released from any confinement to a prison or correctional institution imposed for the crime) more than 5 years before the date of application for a visa or other documentation and the date of application for admission to the United States, or (II) the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or which the alien admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits having committed constituted the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed). (B)…Any alien convicted of 2 or more offenses (other than purely political offenses), regardless of whether the conviction was in a single trial or whether the offenses arose from a single scheme of misconduct and regardless of whether the offenses involved moral turpitude, for which the aggregate sentences to confinement were 5 years or more is inadmissible.")

¹¹In regards to ATTORNEYS, California Business and Professions Code Section 6101(a), provides: "(a) Conviction of a felony or misdemeanor, involving moral turpitude, constitutes a cause for disbarment or suspension. In any proceeding, whether under this article or otherwise, to disbar or suspend an attorney on account of that conviction, the record of conviction shall be conclusive evidence of guilt of the crime of which he or she has been convicted." In regards to STATE EMPLOYEES, California Government Code Section 19572(k) provides: "Each of the following constitutes cause for discipline of an employee, or of a person whose name appears on any employment list...(k) Conviction of a felony or conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. A plea or verdict of guilty, or a conviction following a plea of nolo contendere, to a charge of a felony or any offense involving moral turpitude is deemed to be a conviction within the meaning of this section."

¹²In re Rothrock 16 Cal.2d 449, 459 (1940) [state bar discipline] ("Our statute…does not define assault with a deadly weapon so as to indicate that it is an offense which by these tests involve moral turpitude as a matter of law. That it did not involve moral turpitude in the particular case may be reflected by the record of conviction, which is all that is before the court in this proceeding. The record consists of the charge of the offense to which the defendant pleaded guilty; the plea; and the judgment of conviction…The light sentence imposed on the attorney indicates that the trial court was of the opinion that the offense to which a plea of guilty was entered did not involve moral turpitude. Our consideration of the record leads us to the same conclusion.")

¹³People v. Cavazos 172 Cal.App.3d 589, 595 (1985) [impeachment] ("Assuming, as we must, that an assault with a deadly weapon does not require proof of a specific intent to harm another, it nevertheless does require proof of an unlawful attempt to inflict physical force upon another person. The jury is so instructed. Because an attempt to commit a battery requires a specific intent to commit the battery and a direct but ineffectual act done towards its commission and because a deadly weapon is used to effectuate the attempted battery, it follows that the 'least adjudicated elements' of the crime of an assault with a deadly weapon involve some degree of moral turpitude. It is the use of the deadly weapon which elevates the assault to a moral turpitude crime. The Supreme Court holdings in attorney discipline cases that assault with a deadly weapon does not necessarily involve moral turpitude should be distinguished. In those cases, the court was formulating a standard by which to determine the attorney's fitness to continue his practice according to the ethical standards of his profession. Simple fairness requires the court to look behind the conviction to ascertain the precise nature of the assault and the circumstances in which it occurred. The bare fact of conviction does not determine the attorney's fitness to practice. Our conclusion that an assault with a deadly weapon necessarily involves moral turpitude accords with common sense and generally accepted community standards. The average person walking down the street would believe that anyone who unlawfully attempts to injure another with a deadly weapon is guilty of some degree of moral laxity." Internal citations omitted)

¹⁴In re Higbie 6 Cal.3d 562, 565 (1972) [state bar discipline]

¹⁵Nunez v. Holder 594 F.3d 1124, 1124 (2010) [cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B)]

¹⁶In re Craig 12 Cal.2d 93, 97 (1938)

¹⁷People v. White 4 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1304 (1992) [impeachment] ("We conclude that under the principles set forth in Watson, a person who demonstrates such wanton disregard for the life of another by firing shots into an inhabited dwelling could be convicted of second degree murder should someone die as a result. Castro defines moral turpitude as a readiness to do evil. A 'second degree murder conviction certainly demonstrates a readiness to do evil, murder being the most evil of crimes.'" Internal citations omitted)

¹⁸People v. Castro 38 Cal.3d 301, 315, supra ("Far more controversial than the elimination of felony convictions which do not denote moral turpitude of any kind is the use of convictions of crimes which involve moral depravity other than dishonesty: child molestation, crimes of violence, torture, brutality and so on. While the case in which Justice Holmes explained the rational basis for felony impeachment did involve a prior conviction of a crime which implied dishonesty - 'falsely personating' a United States revenue officer - Holmes' reasoning does not depend on dishonesty being an element of the felony. Obviously it is easier to infer that a witness is lying if the felony of which he has been convicted involves dishonesty as a necessary element than when it merely indicates a 'bad character' and 'general readiness to do evil.' Nevertheless, it is undeniable that a witness' moral depravity of any kind has some 'tendency in reason' to shake one's confidence in his honesty. We ourselves recognized this in People v. Rist, supra, where we said that 'convictions which are assaultive in nature do not weigh as heavily in the balance favoring admissibility as those convictions which are based on dishonesty or some other lack of integrity.' 'Not as heavily' does not, of course, mean 'not at all.'" Internal citations omitted)

¹⁹Nunez v. Holder 594 F.3d 1124, 1129 (2010) [cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B)] ("Because we agree that California Penal Code § 314 covers a broader range of offenses than the generic definition of crimes of moral turpitude, we hold that indecent exposure is not categorically such a crime.")

²⁰Nunez v. Holder 594 F.3d 1124, 1139, supra (Bybee in dissent: "Because I believe that Ocegueda's conviction for indecent exposure under § 314 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, I would uphold the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals and deny the petition. I respectfully dissent.") SEE ALSO People v. Ballard 13 Cal. App. 4th 687, 697 (1993) [impeachment] ("Under California law, the offense of felony indecent exposure, a crime of moral turpitude, was properly used to impeach appellant's testimony.")

²¹People v. Omledo 167 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1098 (1985) [impeachment] ("We conclude therefore that assault with intent to murder involves moral turpitude.")

²²In re Lesansky 25 Cal.4th 11, 16 (2001) [state bar discipline] ("In reaffirming that attorneys may be disbarred for criminal acts committed in a nonprofessional setting, we do not hold that such discipline may be imposed for any act evidencing a moral lapse or infirmity, however slight. Attorney discipline is imposed when necessary to protect the public, to promote confidence in the legal system, and to maintain high professional standards, and the term 'moral turpitude' is defined by reference to this purpose. As we have in the past, we acknowledge here that the term cannot be defined with precision. Nevertheless, we can provide this guidance: Criminal conduct not committed in the practice of law or against a client reveals moral turpitude if it shows a deficiency in any character trait necessary for the practice of law (such as trustworthiness, honesty, fairness, candor, and fidelity to fiduciary duties) or if it involves such a serious breach of a duty owed to another or to society, or such a flagrant disrespect for the law or for societal norms, that knowledge of the attorney's conduct would be likely to undermine public confidence in and respect for the legal profession." Internal citations and quotations omitted)

²³People v. Miles 172 Cal.App.3d 474, 482 (1985) [impeachment] ("We therefore necessarily conclude that under Castro, the least adjudicated elements of [arson] necessarily involve an intent 'to do evil' or, in other words, moral turpitude…")

²⁴People v. Rodriguez 177 Cal.App.3d 174, 178 (1986) [impeachment] ("Several post-Castro cases have also held that the felony of automobile theft necessarily involves moral turpitude. Since attempted automobile theft requires a specific intent to steal and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission…it follows that the 'least adjudicated elements' of the crime of attempted automobile theft also necessarily involves moral turpitude.")

²⁵People v. Lindsay 206 Cal.App.3d 849, 857 (1989) [impeachment] ("The knowledge element of the crime of battery upon a peace officer (that defendant know or reasonably should have known the victim was a peace officer in the performance of his duties) clearly involves moral turpitude. There is no doubt the intentional, willful and unlawful use of force upon a peace officer, however slight, coupled with the actual knowledge the victim is a peace officer in the performance of his or her duties, is clearly a crime of moral turpitude and demonstrates a readiness to do evil.") NOTE that courts have disagreed in other kinds of battery cases. In the impeachment context, a court held that aggravated battery was not a CIMT, while in a state civil service employee discipline case another court held that simple battery could be a CIMT. SEE People v. Mansfield 200 Cal.App.3d 82, 88 (1988) [impeachment] ("This concept simply means that in determining whether a previous felony involves moral turpitude the court cannot go behind the conviction and take evidence on or consider the facts and circumstances of the particular offense. Instead, the court must look to the statutory definition of the particular crime and only if the least adjudicated elements of the crime necessarily involve moral turpitude is the prior conviction admissible for impeachment purposes….A person need not have an intent to injure to commit a battery. He only needs to intend to commit the act. …Thus, a simple battery does not necessarily show a readiness to do evil or necessarily involve moral turpitude.") COMPARE with Padilla v. State Personnel Board, 8 Cal.App.4^th 1136, 1140 (1992) [state civil service employee discipline] ("The question is one of statutory construction. The statutory phrase 'conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude' is ambiguous. It might mean conviction of a misdemeanor whose elements constitute moral turpitude or a misdemeanor that by the manner of its commission involves moral turpitude. The latter is the correct reading.")

²⁶People v. Collins 42 Cal.3d 378, 395 (1986) [impeachment] ("Applying this procedure to the case at bar, we determine first whether the two prior convictions challenged in defendant's motion to exclude -- burglary and robbery -- are inadmissible as a matter of law because they do not necessarily involve moral turpitude. To answer this question we look to the elements of each crime…Burglary is committed by every person 'who enters any house [or other structure or vehicle listed in the statute] ... with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony.' An intent to commit larceny evidences a willingness to act dishonestly, and ipso facto reflects on the witness's credibility. Although an intent to commit 'any felony' includes both felonies that necessarily involve moral turpitude and felonies that do not, the distinction is immaterial for present purposes: whether or not the target felony itself evidences a moral defect, burglary remains in all cases the fundamentally deceitful act of entering a house or other listed structure with the secret intent to steal or commit another serious crime inside. A felony conviction of such an act demonstrates a 'readiness to do evil' and hence necessarily involves moral turpitude. Robbery is defined as the taking of property from the person of another, against his will, by force or fear. It is thus larceny aggravated by an assault, and is likewise a felony that necessarily involves moral turpitude." Internal citations omitted)

²⁷People v. Brooks 3 Cal.App.4th 669, 671 (1992) [impeachment] ("Mindful of the advice in Castro, the People refer us to a federal decision involving immigration law. In Guerrero de Nodahl v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., the court upheld a determination of the Board of Immigration Appeals that section 273d was a crime of moral turpitude and conviction of that offense justified the petitioner's deportation. The court stated: '[W]e rule that inflicting cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury upon a child is so offensive to American ethics that the fact that it was done purposely or willingly definition of willful) ends the debate on whether moral turpitude was involved.' We agree with the conclusion of the federal court in Guerrero de Nodahl that section 273d is a crime of moral turpitude so that a prior conviction for this offense may be used for impeachment." Internal citations and quotations omitted) COMPARE with child endangerment – People v. Sanders 10 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1274 (1992) ("We are not aware of any decision finding a crime is one of moral turpitude when the conviction can result from passive conduct unaccompanied by criminal intent. The Third Appellate District recently found that the offense described in section 273d (willful infliction of cruel or inhuman corporal punishment on a child resulting in traumatic condition) involves moral turpitude. We, however, have previously distinguished sections 273a, subdivision (1), and 273d as being different crimes with different elements. Section 273d requires active conduct by the defendant, resulting in actual injury to the child. In addition, the requirement of cruel or inhuman corporal punishment suggests a baseness of purpose not necessary under section 273a, subdivision (1)….Because section 273a, subdivision (1) can be violated by wholly passive conduct, free from any element of force, violence, threat, fraud, deceit, or stealth, even when motivated by a sincere, good faith but unreasonable belief the conduct is in the child's best interests, we conclude that a conviction under the statute does not necessarily imply a general readiness to do evil or any moral depravity." Internal citations and quotations omitted)

²⁸In re Duggan 17 Cal.3d 416, 422 (1976) [state bar discipline] ("Conviction of some crimes establishes moral turpitude on its face. These include crimes that necessarily involve an intent to defraud or intentional dishonesty for the purpose of personal gain. They may also include particular crimes that are extremely repugnant to accepted moral standards such as murder or serious sexual offenses. We do not hold that the offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor as proscribed by Penal Code section 272 is one involving moral turpitude per se. Rather, we conclude that under the facts of this case, the offense of which petitioner was convicted on his plea of guilty involved as a matter of law a crime of moral turpitude. Without setting forth the unfortunate details, it is enough for us to say that the offense to which petitioner pleaded guilty evidences the commission of a reprehensible crime, offensive to every conception of morality." Internal citations and quotations omitted)

²⁹CEB California Criminal Law Procedure and Practice (Which Priors Involve Moral Turpitude) § 24.46B

³⁰People v. Rodriguez 5 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1402 (1992) [impeachment] ("To violate Penal Code section 273.5 the assailant must, at the very least, have set out, successfully, to injure a person of the opposite sex in a special relationship for which society rationally demands, and the victim may reasonably expect, stability and safety, and in which the victim, for these reasons among others, may be especially vulnerable. To have joined in, and thus necessarily to be aware of, that special relationship, and then to violate it wilfully and with intent to injure, necessarily connotes the general readiness to do evil that has been held to define moral turpitude.") BUT SEE In re Otto 48 Cal.3d 970, 971 (1989) [state bar discipline] ("This court, after reviewing the entire record and considering all the facts and circumstances, has concluded that Otto's conduct constituted misconduct warranting discipline [but not moral turpitude] and that he should be disciplined in accordance with the State Bar's recommendation.")

³¹People v. Forster 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1757 (1994) [impeachment; distinguishes state bar discipline case] ("First, [state bar discipline case] involved misdemeanor driving under the influence, not the felony driving under the influence with three prior convictions of driving under the influence. Second, attorney disciplinary cases are not determinative on the issue of moral turpitude for purposes of a Castro analysis.")

³²California Jurisprudence, 3rd, Vol. 7A (Attorneys at Law) § 292, Vol. 17 (Criminal Law: Core Aspects) § 83, Vol. 21A (Criminal Law: Trial)

³³Cal.Jur.3d, supra.

³⁴In re Lamb 49 Cal.3d 239, 246 (1989) [state bar discipline] ("Petitioner's deceitful acts were of exceptional gravity. Her conduct threatened innumerable clients with significant injury through unknowing exposure to an unqualified practitioner. It undermined the integrity of the State Bar's admission system, on which public confidence in the competence of attorneys is founded.")

³⁵Cal.Jur.3d, supra.

³⁶Cal.Jur.3d, supra.

³⁷In the Matter of the Appeal by Douglas Durham, SPB Case No. 36133 (1995) (Precedential Decision) [state civil service employee discipline] ("Appellant in this instance engaged in repeated instances of fraud against his own employer, the State of California. The ALJ found that, during the period 1992-1993, appellant willfully and unlawfully registered a 1975 Ford van in Oregon, without paying California vehicle registration fees. During this time period, appellant owned a home in Smith River, California, which was undergoing extensive repairs, although he frequently spent nights at a rented residence in Brookings, Oregon, when it was impossible for him to sleep in his Smith River home. At all relevant times, appellant held a California driver's license, never held an Oregon driver's license, and intended to return to his home in California once the repairs were completed….Moreover, he plead nolo contendere to knowingly making false statements to the DMV, falsifying a certificate of ownership, and registering a vehicle in a foreign jurisdiction without the payment of appropriate fees and taxes to the State of California, in violation of Vehicle Code sections 20, 4463, and 8804, respectively. Accordingly, because the facts upon which the convictions under the Vehicle Code were based involved dishonesty and intentional action to defraud the State of California, we conclude that appellant's convictions were for crimes involving moral turpitude.")

³⁸Wilson v. State Personnel Board, 39 Cal.App.3d 218, 221 (1974) [state civil service employee discipline] ("Whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a question of law. Moral turpitude includes fraud; a crime in which an intent to defraud is an element is a crime involving moral turpitude. Violation of section 2101 of the Unemployment Insurance Code involves both intent to defraud and a false statement made for the purpose of perpetrating the fraud. Therefore, section 2101 defines a crime involving moral turpitude." Internal citations omitted)

³⁹In re Basinger 45 Cal.3d 1348, 1358 (1988) [state bar discipline] ("In addition, petitioner's criminal conviction of grand theft is conclusive evidence of his guilt, and that crime necessarily involves moral turpitude. It has long been the rule that misappropriation of client trust funds is a most serious offense by an attorney and generally warrants disbarment absent the existence of compelling mitigating circumstances." Internal citations omitted)

⁴⁰People v. Zataray 173 Cal.App.3d 390, 400 (1985) [impeachment] ("Given the nature of the crime, it is reasonable to conclude that simple kidnapping involves 'bad character' and 'readiness to do evil' and thus is admissible for impeachment purposes under Castro.")

⁴¹People v. Castro 38 Cal.3d 301, 317 supra ("We hold that while simple possession of heroin does not necessarily involve moral turpitude…possession for sale does – though the trait involved is not dishonesty but, rather, the intent to corrupt others.")

⁴²People v. Mazza 175 Cal.App.3d 836, 843 (1986) ("While it may be suggested that the definition of moral turpitude may depend on the state of public morals, and that it may vary according to the community and the times, it never has been suggested that our public morality has sunk so low as to countenance the singularly depraved act of rape. Conviction of some crimes establishes moral turpitude on its face. Moral turpitude has been defined as a readiness to do evil and as a character trait which can reasonably be characterized as immoral. An act of moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. Rape fits every suggested definition of moral turpitude. It is a reprehensible crime, offensive to every conception of morality. We hold that rape is a crime involving moral turpitude." Internal citations and quotations omitted)

⁴³People v. Collins 42 Cal.3d 378, supra.

⁴⁴In re Utz 48 Cal.3d 468, 484 (1989) [state bar discipline] ("The jury was required to find that the petitioner had the intent to defraud in order to convict. Fraud is a 'principal element' of moral turpitude.")

⁴⁵In re Kirschke 16 Cal.3d 902, 904 (1976) [state bar discipline] ("We have twice determined -- in our interim suspension of petitioner and in our order to him to show cause why he should not be disciplined -- that the murder he stands convicted of committing involved moral turpitude….As petitioner has been convicted of the gravest of crimes and no mitigating circumstances are apparent, we can only conclude that he is presently unqualified to practice law in this state.")

⁴⁶In the Matter of Katz (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 502, 513 [state bar discipline] ("The hearing judge found that Katz's conviction on one count of perjury involved moral turpitude, both inherently and in the surrounding facts and circumstances, and that compelling mitigating circumstances did not predominate")

⁴⁷Nunez v. Holder 594 F.3d 1124, 1128, supra ("While under our law numerous felonies are deemed not to be morally turpitudinous, all acts of petty theft automatically qualify for that label and the drastic legal consequences that may follow. As some in today's society might say, and with good reason, 'Go figure.'")

⁴⁸People v. Jaimez 184 Cal.App.3d 146, 150 (1986) [impeachment] ("Pimping and pandering involve the corruption of others. The perpetrator of these offenses encourages, or profits from, the commission of crimes by others. The offenses evidence a readiness to do evil and are extremely repugnant to accepted moral standards." Internal quotations and citations omitted)

⁴⁹CEB California Criminal Law Practice and Procedure § 24.46B

⁵⁰Cal.Jur.3d, supra.

⁵¹In re Mostman 47 Cal.3d 725, 737 supra [state bar discipline] ("We decline to adopt an inflexible rule on the proper characterization of criminal solicitation. In one sense, the act of soliciting another person to commit an offense may demonstrate moral turpitude rendering an attorney unfit to practice law regardless of the nature of the underlying offense. But it is also possible to conceive of situations in which an attorney convicted of soliciting an offense that itself involved moral turpitude might not be culpable under our commonsense disciplinary standard.")

⁵²People v. Rodriguez 177 Cal.App.3d 174, 179, supra [impeachment] ("Although it is not a specific intent crime, a necessary element of the offense of receiving stolen property is actual knowledge of the stolen character of the property... One who unlawfully acts in disregard for the property rights of others, whether known or unknown, demonstrates moral laxity and to some degree a 'readiness to do evil.'")

⁵³People v. Campbell 23 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1495 (1994) [impeachment] ("Since, as we have explained, the mens rea of malice required for any offense under section 594 is sufficient to establish 'readiness to do evil,' felony vandalism is not analogous to felony battery for purposes of moral turpitude." Internal citation omitted)

⁵⁴In re Alkow 64 Cal.2d 838, 840 (1966) [state bar discipline] ("It is clear that the circumstances surrounding the manslaughter involved moral turpitude….Alkow's conduct showed a complete disregard for the conditions of his probation, the law, and the safety of the public and involved moral turpitude under the foregoing definitions.")

⁵⁵In re Strick 43 Cal.3d 644, 654 1987 [state bar discipline] ("While it is not conclusive, we are mindful of our prior determination that the record of petitioner's convictions revealed probable cause of moral turpitude. Nothing in the record of the State Bar proceedings convinces us otherwise. Indeed, petitioner does not contradict the facts which we found to establish moral turpitude." Internal citations omitted)

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