"Aiding and abetting" (also sometimes called "accomplice liability") is not itself a crime.
Rather, it's a legal principle in California that allows the state to prosecute everyone who is "in on" a crime...even if they don't perpetrate the crime directly.
Example: Alan, Bill and Charlie plan out a bank robbery. Each plays a different role. Alan draws up a diagram of the teller windows and the safes. He gives it to Bill (after which Alan's role is done). Charlie drives Bill to the bank and waits out front in the getaway car. Bill actually goes in and robs the bank. Bill comes running out with the loot, jumps in the car, and Charlie drives the two of them off.
Technically speaking, only Bill did the actual "robbing." But prosecutors could charge all three with bank robbery: Bill as the direct perpetrator, Alan and Charlie as aiders and abettors. In Alan's case, he's liable for the robbery even though he wasn't even present at the crime scene.
That's because California's aiding and abetting laws assign criminal liability to anyone who
- facilitates, or
in the commission of a crime, no matter how seemingly insignificant that person's role.1 But there must be some type of involvement before you can be convicted. Mere knowledge about the crime or presence at the scene will not suffice.2
And unlike a conspiracy, there needn't be a prior agreement to commit the offense...you face liability simply for your voluntary involvement.
Typical legal defenses put forward by a California defendant charged as an aider and abettor include asserting that he:
- did not encourage, aid or facilitate the crime's commission
- was falsely accused
- withdrew from participation in the criminal activity
- was merely present at the scene, or perhaps even had knowledge about the crime, but had no duty to try to prevent its commission
- only facilitated the crime after its commission (and should face, if anything, the lesser penalties as an accessory after the fact)
An aider and abettor generally faces the same criminal charges as the direct perpetrator. If convicted, he typically also faces the same penalties. In a murder case, for example, an aider and abettor typically faces life in prison just as does the one who commits the actual killing.
Below, our California criminal defense attorneys3 explain California's aiding and abetting laws...and the applicable defenses to these laws...by addressing the following:
If, after reading this article, you would like more information, we invite you to contact us at Shouse Law Group.
You may also find helpful information in our related articles on Conspiracy; Being an Accessory After the Fact; and California Legal Defenses.
The phrase "aiding and abetting" means helping another person commit a crime. Prosecutors can charge you as an aider and abettor when you
- know the perpetrator's illegal plan,
- intentionally encourage and/or facilitate that plan, and
- aid, promote, or instigate the crime.4
Despite the fact that it sounds as if you must encourage or promote the criminal activity in advance, that isn't necessarily the case. Aiding and abetting may be committed as instantaneously as the crime itself. If you become aware that a crime is being committed...and at that point, encourage, facilitate or promote its occurrence...the judge or jury can still find you guilty under an accomplice liability theory.5
As far as "encouraging, facilitating or promoting" the offense, there is no requirement that your conduct be a substantial factor in the offense. "Liability attaches to anyone 'concerned,' however slight."6
Common examples include:
- serving as a lookout,
- keeping an engine running in a car, or
- driving the "get-away" car.7
You can also be convicted of aiding and abetting even if you are legally incapable of committing the actual offense yourself.
Aiding and abetting rapeA deputy sheriff ordered a jail inmate to perform oral sex upon another inmate. He was convicted of violating a California law that specifically prohibits inmates from engaging in oral copulation. In other words, the law makes it a crime for one inmate to engage in oral copulation with another inmate.
The deputy argued that because he was not an inmate, he couldn't be convicted of this particular crime. The court disagreed, stating that "Under an aiding and abetting theory, a defendant can properly be convicted of a crime even though by statutory definition the defendant would be incapable of committing the substantive offense by himself".8
Aiding and abetting rapeSimilarly, a woman cannot physically rape another woman, as rape necessarily involves intercourse. However, if a woman encourages a man to rape another woman, serves as a lookout for that man, and/or arranges the meeting of the man and woman in a secluded location so that he can rape her, she could be prosecuted for rape under the accomplice liability theory.
While aiding and abetting may sound like the California crime of conspiracy ...and although the two are closely related..."aiding and abetting" and conspiracy are actually two different offenses. The major difference between the two is that for there to be a conspiracy there must be an agreement to participate in criminal activity.9 Whereas aiding and abetting does not necessarily require an agreement.
With respect to the criminal allegation, the prosecutor doesn't "charge you" with aiding and abetting. Rather, he or she charges you with the underlying crime and presents the case on the theory that you acted as an aider and abettor.10
In determining whether you acted as an accomplice, among the factors to be considered are:
- "presence at the scene of the crime,
- companionship, and
- conduct before or after the offense".11
Note that these are just some of the factors that help determine whether you should be charged as an accomplice. But they are not conclusive. Which leads to the next section...
There is no requirement that you be present at the crime scene in order to be convicted under an accomplice liability theory.12 Neither must you physically or logistically assist in the commission of the crime. Instigating, encouraging or promoting the crime is sufficient.13 The test is whether you "in any way, directly or indirectly, aided the perpetrator by acts or encouraged him by words or gestures."14
Example: Defendant was convicted of insurance fraud for filing a false personal injury claim. The co-defendant, the defendant's girlfriend, was the one who actually forged the necessary signatures and filed the claims. The defendant knew the fraudulent claims had been filed and blatantly lied to the insurance investigator, saying he had received medical treatment (which he hadn't) and that he had to take time off work (which he didn't). The defendant argued that because he didn't actually assist in filing the fraudulent paperwork, there was no accomplice liability.
The court disagreed. It held that because defendant knew about the claims that were fraudulently filed on his behalf...and therefore had knowledge about the perpetrator's plan and encouraged its commission by lying, thus intending to defraud the insurance company...he was properly convicted on an aiding and abetting theory. This was the case despite the fact that he did not physically participate in the crime.15
Simply knowing that the offense is about to be (or is being) committed and failing to prevent it isn't enough in and of itself to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting.16 However, if you have a legal duty to take every step reasonably possible to prevent the crime...and fail to do so...you could be convicted as an aider and abettor.
This "legal duty" is only imposed on certain people under specific conditions. For examples, teachers, doctors and certain other professionals have a legal duty to report abuse or other suspected criminal activity. And, in California, parents have a legal duty to "exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and control over their minor children".17
So if you have a legal duty to try to prevent a crime...but do not reasonably attempt to do so...you could face accomplice liability.
Example: Defendant was convicted of committing
lewd acts on a minor as an aider and abettor. The prosecutor presented evidence that the defendant stood by and watched her boyfriend molest her 4-year-old daughter on more than one occasion.
The defendant argued that because she didn't encourage or participate in the lewd acts on the minor, she shouldn't be liable as an accomplice. However, the court ruled that the defendant/mother's presence, in itself, assisted the boyfriend, since her presence not only encouraged the boyfriend to continue molesting her daughter but also encouraged her daughter to comply rather than resist.
Moreover, the court held that because the defendant had a legal duty to act (to protect her child)...yet failed to do so...she was properly convicted under an aiding and abetting theory.18
Fortunately, there are a variety of legal defenses that apply to accomplice liability that a skilled California criminal defense attorney could present on your behalf. The following are some of the most common:
If you didn't encourage, facilitate or otherwise aid in the commission of the crime in any way, you are not guilty of aiding and abetting.
Suppose, for example, you're a passenger in a car with some friends when the driver decides to go rob a liquor store. You remain in the car while he and another passenger barge into a 7-11, wave a gun, and take money from the cash register. But you weren't aware of their plan when you first got in the car...and you did nothing to help facilitate it. In this scenario, you were "merely present" and shouldn't be held liable for the robbery.
There are an infinite number of ways that the allegation that you aided, facilitated or encouraged a crime could have been misunderstood. The bottom line is that if you didn't intentionally engage in one of these acts, you should be acquitted from any accomplice liability.
Because there need not be any physical proof that you aided and abetted another person in the commission of a crime, it is easy for someone falsely to accuse you of doing so. This would most likely be the case if, for example, someone was trying to divert his/her own criminal culpability by fingering you as the mastermind of the operation.
Anger, revenge or jealousy could also prompt someone to accuse you of being involved in a crime in which you played no part.
But as Riverside criminal defense attorney Michael Scafiddi19 explains, "Our law firm...comprised of former police investigators and district attorneys...knows the most effective ways to investigate cases and scrutinize witnesses to ensure that your false charges are brought to light."
If...before the commission of the charged crime(s)...you withdrew from participation by
- notifying the other people involved in the crime of your intention to withdraw from participation, and
- doing everything in your power to prevent the crime from going forward,
you should be acquitted of being an aider and abettor.20
Example: You and another person plan to rob a store. You are responsible for being the lookout outside. But as you get to the location, you decide you no longer want to participate. So you tell your crime partner that you are backing out. You also try to persuade him not to go through with it. He nevertheless decides to go ahead with the
robbery on his own. In the meantime, you call the police and place an anonymous tip that the store is about to be robbed. Unfortunately, they arrive too late to prevent it.
Given these facts, a jury could reasonably find that you (1) effectively communicated your intent to withdraw from the robbery, and (2) tried to prevent its commission. You would probably be acquitted of the robbery charges.
But let's change the facts. Let's say that you still communicate your intent to withdraw and try to persuade the perpetrator to do the same. But instead of calling the police, you simply leave and go home. Under these circumstances, you really didn't do everything you could to prevent it. Therefore you probably would not prevail using a "withdrawal" defense.
It bears repeating that even if you know that a crime is going to be committed...but do nothing to prevent its occurrence...you are not guilty of being an aider and abettor unless you have a legal duty to act.
And because legal duties are so few and far between...since they must be specifically conferred upon you by a law...they will not come into play very often.
As a result, mere knowledge of the underlying crime will not typically be enough to convict you as an aider and abettor.21
If you do help facilitate the crime...but only after it is over...you are not an aider and abettor. You may, however, be an accessory after the fact. Accessories after the fact are not treated in the same manner as accomplices, but are instead treated as "obstructers of justice".22
Consequently, if you are convicted of being an accessory after the fact, you will most likely face a much lesser penalty than you would as an accomplice to the crime. An aider and abettor to carjacking, for example, faces up to 9 years in prison (just as does the actual perpetrator). Whereas the maximum penalty for being an accomplice after the fact is three years in the California state prison.23
If you "aid and abet" another person during the commission of a crime, you may also be referred to as an accessory before the fact.
But there is no distinction between being an accessory before the fact / accomplice / "aider and abettor" or the actual perpetrator when it comes to sentencing. Each individual will be regarded as a "principal" to the crime and is subject to the same penalties as if he/she personally committed the offense.24
The only exception to this rule applies to murder prosecutions, discussed in the next section.25
As the Supreme Court of California recognized, in some situations, an aider and abettor may be guilty of a greater homicide-related offense than the actual perpetrator, since defenses or extenuating circumstances may exist that are personal to the actual perpetrator and do not apply to the aider and abettor.26
Example: Two defendants fire shots in a drive-by shooting. Only one defendant fires the shot that actually kills the victim. He is labeled the perpetrator, and the other defendant ...who was riding in the passenger seat...is labeled the "aider and abettor".
If, for example, the perpetrator proves that he only fired that shot in
self-defense, his charge would be reduced to
voluntary manslaughter or possibly even dismissed. However, the second defendant (the aider and abettor)...who still shot at and intended to kill the victim in the drive-by shooting...could still be convicted of murder.27
Aiders and abettors are not only equally responsible for the perpetrator's intended criminal activity. They are also equally responsible for any crimes that are the natural and probable consequences of that original crime.28
"Natural and probable consequences" are foreseeable consequences given all the surrounding circumstances.29 Whether a further crime is a "natural and probable consequence" of the original planned crime is a question that the jury must answer.30
Example: The defendant was in charge of driving the "get-away" car after the perpetrator robbed a jewelry store. The perpetrator entered the store wearing a ski parka with a hood and sunglasses and carrying a brown paper bag that held a pillow.
While in the store, the perpetrator shot an employee in the face, and then shot and killed the store owner. The defendant argued that he should not suffer accomplice liability for murder and attempted murder because he did not share in the perpetrator's intent to kill either victim.
The court disagreed. It reasoned that "to 'share' the perpetrator's intent does not mean that the aider and abettor is prepared to commit the offense by his own act. All that is needed is a knowing intent to assist the perpetrator's commission of the crime. Once that intent is formed, the liability of an aider and abettor 'extends also to the natural and reasonable consequences of the acts he knowingly and intentionally aids and encourages'".
When the perpetrator entered the store with a gun and a pillow to muffle the sound of possible gunfire, the shootings were indeed a natural and probable consequence of the robbery itself.31
Call us for help...
If you or loved one is charged with aiding and abetting and you are looking to hire an attorney for representation, we invite you to contact us at Shouse Law Group. We can provide a free consultation in office or by phone. We have local offices in Los Angeles, the San Fernando Valley, Pasadena, Long Beach, Orange County, Ventura, San Bernardino, Rancho Cucamonga, Riverside, San Diego, Sacramento, Oakland, San Francisco, San Jose and throughout California.
To learn more about Nevada aiding & abetting law, go to our article on Nevada aiding & abetting law.
1 California Jury Instructions - Criminal "CALJIC" 3.01 -- Aiding and Abetting. ("A person aids and abets the [commission] [or] [attempted commission] of a crime when he or she: (1) With knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and (2) With the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime, and (3) By act or advice, [or, by failing to act in a situation where a person has a legal duty to act,] aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime. [A person who aids and abets the [commission] [or] [attempted commission] of a crime need not be present at the scene of the crime.] [Mere presence at the scene of a crime which does not itself assist the commission of the crime does not amount to aiding and abetting.] [Mere knowledge that a crime is being committed and [in the absence of a legal duty to take every step reasonably possible to prevent the crime,] the failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting.]")
2 See same.
3 Our California criminal defense attorneys have local Los Angeles law offices in Beverly Hills, Burbank, Glendale, Lancaster, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Pasadena, Pomona, Torrance, Van Nuys, West Covina, and Whittier. We have additional law offices conveniently located throughout the state in Orange County, San Diego, Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura, San Jose, Oakland, the San Francisco Bay area, and several nearby cities.
4 See CALJIC 3.01, Aiding and Abetting, endnote 1, above.
5 People v. Swanson-Birabent (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 733, 751-752. ("Contrary to defendant's assertion, advance knowledge is not a prerequisite for liability as an aider and abettor. "Aiding and abetting may be committed 'on the spur of the moment,' that is, as instantaneously as the criminal act itself. [Citation.]" ( People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 532, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323.) In People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742 ( Cooper ), the court held that "a getaway driver who has no prior knowledge of a robbery, but who forms the intent to aid in carrying away the loot during such asportation, may properly be found liable as an aider and abettor of the robbery." ( Id. at p. 1161, 282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742.) The court reasoned that "the commission of robbery continues so long as the loot is being carried away to a place of temporary safety." ( Id. at p. 1170, 282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742; see also People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1039, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 874 P.2d 903 [upholding burglary conviction for aider and abettor who did not have knowledge of criminal purpose until after entry].)")
6 People v. Durham (1969) 70 Cal.2d 171, 185, fn. 11.
7 People v. Masters (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 672, 680.
8 People v. Fraize (1995) 36 C.A.4th 1722.
9 California Penal Code 182 PC - Conspiracy. ("(a) If two or more persons conspire: (1) To commit any crime. (2) Falsely and maliciously to indict another for any crime, or to procure another to be charged or arrested for any crime. (3) Falsely to move or maintain any suit, action, or proceeding. (4) To cheat and defraud any person of any property, by any means which are in themselves criminal, or to obtain money or property by false pretenses or by false promises with fraudulent intent not to perform those promises. (5) To commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to pervert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the laws. (6) To commit any crime against the person of the President or Vice President of the United States, the Governor of any state or territory, any United States justice or judge, or the secretary of any of the executive departments of the United States. They are punishable as follows: When they conspire to commit any crime against the person of any official specified in paragraph (6), they are guilty of a felony and are punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for five, seven, or nine years. When they conspire to commit any other felony, they shall be punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as is provided for the punishment of that felony. If the felony is one for which different punishments are prescribed for different degrees, the jury or court which finds the defendant guilty thereof shall determine the degree of the felony the defendant conspired to commit. If the degree is not so determined, the punishment for conspiracy to commit the felony shall be that prescribed for the lesser degree, except in the case of conspiracy to commit murder, in which case the punishment shall be that prescribed for murder in the first degree. If the felony is conspiracy to commit two or more felonies which have different punishments and the commission of those felonies constitute but one offense of conspiracy, the penalty shall be that prescribed for the felony which has the greater maximum term. When they conspire to do an act described in paragraph (4), they shall be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine. When they conspire to do any of the other acts described in this section, they shall be punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or in the state prison, or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine. When they receive a felony conviction for conspiring to commit identity theft, as defined in Section 530.5, the court may impose a fine of up to twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000). All cases of conspiracy may be prosecuted and tried in the superior court of any county in which any overt act tending to effect the conspiracy shall be done. (b) Upon a trial for conspiracy, in a case where an overt act is necessary to constitute the offense, the defendant cannot be convicted unless one or more overt acts are expressly alleged in the indictment or information, nor unless one of the acts alleged is proved; but other overt acts not alleged may be given in evidence.")
See also California Penal Code 184 PC - Conspiracy; overt act. ("No agreement amounts to a conspiracy, unless some act, beside such agreement, be done within this state to effect the object thereof, by one or more of the parties to such agreement and the trial of cases of conspiracy may be had in any county in which any such act be done.")
10 California Penal Code 971 PC -- Abrogation of distinction between accessories and principals, and between principals in first and second degree; effect upon pleadings. ("The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal, and between principals in the first and second degree is abrogated; and all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, who by the operation of other provisions of this code are principals therein, shall hereafter be prosecuted, tried and punished as principals and no other facts need be alleged in any accusatory pleading against any such person than are required in an accusatory pleading against a principal.")
See also People v. Kennedy (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 273, 275. ("From a reading of this section [Penal Code 971] it is manifest that the information having charged petitioner as a principal, it was open to the district attorney to prove that the former actually committed the offense or that he aided and abetted in its commission, or advised and encouraged its commission. Petitioner having been charged as a principal in the crime of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, it was not necessary that he be charged with aiding or abetting in said kidnapping as a prerequisite to the introduction of evidence that he did so, or to warrant a decision by the trial judge, if such aiding and abetting was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that petitioner was guilty as a principal in the commission of the offense.")
11 People v. Singleton (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 488, 492.
12 See CALJIC 3.01 -- Aiding and Abetting, endnote 1, above. ("[A person who aids and abets the [commission] [or] [attempted commission] of a crime need not be present at the scene of the crime.]")
See also People v. Bohmer (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 185, 199. ("The criminal complicity of the man who lights the fuse does not disappear because he is at a distance when the bomb explodes. Penal Code section 31 in relevant part provides: "All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission ... are principals in any crime so committed." It is not necessary that one be physically present when a crime is committed to abet or encourage its commission.")
13 People v. Booth (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1256. ("While accomplice liability cannot be predicated on conduct absent the required mental state, one can be guilty as an accomplice (if he shares the goal of the perpetrator) without having actually assisted the commission of the offense, e.g., by "instigating," or "advising" the perpetrator to commit it or by having been "present for the purpose of its commission." (See Campbell, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 411, and cases cited.)")
14 People v. Villa (1957) 156 Cal. App. 2d 128, 133.
15 People v. Booth, endnote 13, above.
16 See CALJIC 3.01 -- Aiding and Abetting, endnote 1, above. ("[Mere knowledge that a crime is being committed and [in the absence of a legal duty to take every step reasonably possible to prevent the crime,] the failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting.]")
17 Penal Code 272 PC California's contributing to the delinquency of a minor law, section (a)(2).
18 People v. Swanson-Birabent, endnote 5, above.
19 Riverside criminal defense attorney Michael Scafiddi uses his former experience as an Ontario Police Officer to represent clients throughout the Inland Empire including San Bernardino, Riverside, Rancho Cucamonga, Hemet, Banning, Fontana, Joshua Tree, Barstow, Palm Springs and Victorville.
20 CALJIC 3.03 -- Termination of Liability of Aider and Abettor. ("Before the commission of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] , an aider and abettor may withdraw from participation in [that] [those] crime[s], and thus avoid responsibility for [that] [those] crime[s] by doing two things: First, [he] [she] must notify the other principals known to [him] [her] of [his] [her] intention to withdraw from the commission of [that] [those] crime[s]; second, [he] [she] must do everything in [his] [her] power to prevent its commission. The People have the burden of proving that the defendant was a principal in and had not effectively withdrawn from participation in [that] [those] crime[s]. If you have a reasonable doubt that [he] [she] was a principal in and participated as an aider and abettor in a crime charged, you must find [him] [her] not guilty of that crime[.] [, and any crime committed by a co-principal that was a natural and probable consequence of the same crime.]")
21 In re Michael T. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911. ("Mere presence at the scene of a crime which does not itself assist its commission or mere knowledge that a crime is being committed and the failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting.")
22 People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1039, footnote 7. ("[I]n accord[ ] with the clear trend, the accessory after the fact is no longer treated as a party to the underlying felony, as at common law. This kind of accessory is coming to be recognized for what he is: an 'obstructer' of justice, the author of a separate and independent offense."")
23 California Penal Code 32 - Accessories, punishment. ("Except in cases where a different punishment is prescribed, an accessory is punishable by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.")
24 California Penal Code 31 - Principals, defined. ("All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission, and all persons counseling, advising, or encouraging children under the age of fourteen years, or persons who are mentally incapacitated, to commit any crime, or who, by fraud, contrivance, or force, occasion the drunkenness of another for the purpose of causing him to commit any crime, or who, by threats, menaces, command, or coercion, compel another to commit any crime, are principals in any crime so committed.")
See also People v. Green (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 283, 290. (""Where persons are not actors in the actual commission of the crime charged, but aid and abet others in its commission or procure others to commit the crime, all are equally guilty."")
25 CALJIC 3.00 Principals-Defined. ("Persons who are involved in [committing] [or] [attempting to commit] a crime are referred to as principals in that crime. Each principal, regardless of the extent or manner of participation is [equally guilty.] [guilty of a crime.] Principals include: 1 Those who directly and actively [commit] [or] [attempt to commit] the act constituting the crime, or 2 Those who aid and abet the [commission] [or] [attempted commission] of the crime. [When the crime charged is [either] [murder] [or] [attempted murder] [ ], the aider and abettor's guilt is determined by the combined acts of all the participants as well as that persons own mental state. If the aider and abettor's mental state is more culpable than that of the actual perpetrator, that person's guilt may be greater than that of the actual perpetrator. Similarly, the aider and abettor's guilt may be less than the perpetrator's, if the aider and abettor has a less culpable mental state.]")
26 People v. Mccoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1122. ("We thus conclude that when a person, with the mental state necessary for an aider and abettor, helps or induces another to kill, that person's guilt is determined by the combined acts of all the participants as well as that person's own mens rea. If that person's mens rea is more culpable than another's, that person's guilt may be greater even if the other might be deemed the actual perpetrator.FN3 Because we cannot anticipate all possible nonhomicide crimes or circumstances, we express no view on whether or how these principles apply outside the homicide context. (See Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, supra, § 30.06[C], pp. 450-451.)")
27 Facts taken from same.
28 People v. Coffman (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 106-107. ("Elaborating on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, in People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 261, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013, and People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 12, footnote 5, 221 Cal.Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392, we observed that an aider and abettor "is guilty not only of the offense he intended to facilitate or encourage, but also of any reasonably foreseeable offense committed by the person he aids and abets." As the Court of Appeal in People v. Brigham (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1039, 265 Cal.Rptr. 486 noted, although variations in phrasing are found in decisions addressing the doctrine-"probable and natural," "natural and reasonable," and "reasonably foreseeable"-the ultimate factual question is one of foreseeability. ( Id. at pp. 1050, 1054, 265 Cal.Rptr. 486; see People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 316-322, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274.) "A natural and probable consequence is a foreseeable consequence..."")
See also CALJIC 3.02 Principals-Liability for Natural and Probable Consequences. ("One who aids and abets [another] in the commission of a crime [or crimes] is not only guilty of [that crime] [those crimes], but is also guilty of any other crime committed by a principal which is a natural and probable consequence of the crime[s] originally aided and abetted. In order to find the defendant guilty of the crimes[s] of , [under this theory,] [as charged in Count[s] ,] you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1 The crime [or crimes] of [was] [were] committed; 2 That the defendant aided and abetted [that] [those] crime[s]; 3 That a co-principal in that crime committed the crime[s] of ; and 4 The crime[s] of [was] [were] a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the crime[s] of. [In determining whether a consequence is "natural and probable," you must apply an objective test, based not on what the defendant actually intended, but on what a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence would have expected likely to occur. The issue is to be decided in light of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident. A "natural" consequence is one which is within the normal range of outcomes that may be reasonably expected to occur if nothing unusual has intervened. "Probable" means likely to happen.] [You are not required to unanimously agree as to which originally contemplated crime the defendant aided and abetted, so long as you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously agree that the defendant aided and abetted the commission of an identified and defined target crime and that the crime of __________ was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of that target crime.]")
29 See both cites, endnote 28, above.
30 People v. Godinez (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 492, 499. ("The parties agree the liability of an aider and abettor is not limited to the target crime which he knowingly and intentionally aids and encourages, but can include crimes committed by the perpetrator which are natural and reasonable consequences of the criminal course of conduct the aider and abettor knowingly aids and encourages. ( People v. Jones (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1095-1096 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 464].) It is now settled that it is a question of fact whether the charged offense was a natural and reasonable consequence of the target offense knowingly encouraged, and the jury should be instructed of its responsibility to determine this factual issue.")
31 People v. Hammond (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 463.